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Simplicity Is Worse Than Theft:
A Constraint-Based Explanation of a Seemingly
Counter-Intuitive Russian Saying
Martine Ceberio, Olga Kosheleva, and Vladik Kreinovich
University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA
{mceberio,olgak,vladik}@utep.edu

Abstract. In many practical situations, simpliﬁed models, models that
enable us to gauge the quality of diﬀerent decisions reasonably well, lead
to far-from-optimal situations when used in searching for an optimal
decision. There is even an appropriate Russian saying: simplicity is worse
than theft. In this paper, we provide a mathematical explanation of this
phenomenon.

In science, simplicity is good. The world around us is very complex. One of
the main objectives of science is to simplify it – and since has indeed greatly
succeeded in doing it. For example, when Isaac Newton discovered his dynamical
equations, it allowed him to explain the complex pictures of celestial bodies
motion in terms of simple laws, laws that enable us to predict their positions for
hundreds of years ahead.
From this viewpoint, a simplicity of a description is desirable. Yes, to achieve
this simplicity, we sometimes ignore minor factors – but without such simplifying
assumptions, it is diﬃcult to make predictions, and predictions made based on
these simplifying assumptions is usually reasonably good. For example, in his
celestial mechanics studies, Newton ignored the fact that the planets and the
Sun have ﬁnite size, and treated them as points with mass. To some extent,
this simplifying assumption was justiﬁed: the gravitational ﬁeld of a rotationally
symmetric body is indeed the same as the ﬁeld generated by the point with the
same mass. However, real bodies are not perfectly symmetric, and there is a
small discrepancy between the actual ﬁeld and Newton’s approximate values.
In real life, simplified models – that seem to be working well for prediction – are
sometimes disastrous when we move to decision making. One of the main purposes of science is to explain the world, to be able to predict what is happening
in the world. Once this understanding is reached, once we have acquired the
knowledge about the world, we use this knowledge to come up with actions that
would make the world a better place.
For example, once the scientists get a better understanding of how cracks
propagate through materials, it helps engineers design more stable constructions.
Once the scientists learn about the life cycle of viruses, it helps develop medicines
that prevent and cure the diseases caused by these viruses.

What happens sometimes is that the simpliﬁed models, models which have
led to very accurate predictions, are not as eﬃcient when we use them in decision
making. Numerous examples of such an ineﬃciency can be found in the Soviet
experiment with the global planning of economy; see, e.g., [11] and references
therein. In spite of using latest techniques of mathematical economics, including
the ideas of the Nobelist Wassily Leontieﬀ [5] who started his research as a
leading USSR economist, the results were sometimes disastrous.
For example, during the Soviet times, buckwheat – which many Russian like
to eat – was often diﬃcult to buy. A convincing after-the-fact explanation is
based on the fact that if we describe the economy in too many details, the
corresponding optimization problem becomes too complex to solve. To make it
solvable, the problem has been simpliﬁed, usually by grouping several similar
quantities together. For example, many diﬀerent types of grains were grouped
together into a single grain rubric. The corresponding part of the optimization
task became as follows: optimize the overall grain production under the given
costs. The problem is that for the same expenses, we can get slightly more wheat
than buckwheat. As a result, when we optimize the overall grain production,
buckwheat is replaced by wheat – and thus, the buckwheat production shrank.
A similar example related to transportation is described in [10]. One of the
main symptoms of an ineﬃcient use of trucks is that sometimes, instead of
delivering goods, trucks spend too much time waiting to be loaded, or getting
stuck in traﬃc. Another symptom is when a truck is under-loaded, so that a small
load is ineﬃciently transported by an unnecessarily large truck. In view of these
symptoms, a natural way to gauge the eﬃciency of a transportation company
is to measures the amount of tonne-kilometers that it produced during a given
time period. If this amount is close to the product of the overall truck capacity
and the distance which can be covered during this time period, the company
is more eﬃcient; if this amount is much smaller, there is probably room for
improvement. In view of this criterion, when the ﬁrst eﬃcient reasonably largescale optimization algorithms appeared in the last 1960s, scientists decided to
use these algorithms to ﬁnd the optimal transportation schedule in and around
Moscow – by optimizing the total number of tonne-kilometers. The program did
ﬁnd a mathematically optimal solution, but this solution was absurd: load full
weight on all the trucks in the morning and let them go round and round the
Circular Highway around Moscow :-(
In all these anecdotal examples, a simpliﬁed model – which works reasonably
well in estimating the relative quality of the existing situations – leads to absurd
solutions when used for optimization. Such situations were so frequent that there
is a colorful Russian saying appropriate for this phenomenon: simplicity is worse
than theft.
Question. There is an anecdotal evidence of situations in which the use of simpliﬁed models in optimization leads to absurd solutions. How frequent are such
situations? Are they typical or rare?
To answer this question, let us analyze this question from the mathematical
viewpoint.

Reformulating the question in precise terms. In a general decision making problem, we have a ﬁnite amount of resources, and we need to distribute them between n possible tasks, so as to maximize the resulting outcomes. For example,
a farmer has a ﬁnite amount of money, and we need to allocate them to diﬀerent possible crops so as to maximize the income. Police has a ﬁnite amount of
oﬃcers, and we need to allocate them to diﬀerent potential trouble spots so as
to minimize the resulting amount of crime, etc. In some practical problems, we
have limitations on several diﬀerent types of resources, but for simplicity, we will
assume that all resources are of one type.
Let x0 be the total amount of resources, let n be the total number of possible
tasks, and let x1 , . . . , xn be the amounts allocated to diﬀerent tasks; then, xi ≥ 0
and x1 + . . . + xn = x0 . Let f (x1 , . . . , xn ) be the outcome corresponding to the
allocation x = (x1 , . . . , xn ). In many practical problems, the amount of resources
is reasonably small. In such cases, we can expand the dependence f (x1 , . . . , xn )
in the Taylor series and keep only linear terms in this expansion. In this case,
n
∑
the objective function takes a linear form f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = c0 +
ci · xi . The
i=1

question is then to ﬁnd the values x1 , . . . , xn ≥ 0 for which the sum c0 +
is the largest possible under the constraint that

n
∑

n
∑

ci · xi

i=1

xi = x0 .

i=1

What does simplification means in this formulation. For this problem, simpliﬁcation – in the sense of the above anecdotal examples – means that we replace individual variables by their sum. This can be always done if for two variables xi and
xj , the coeﬃcients ci and cj are equal. In this case, the sum of the corresponding
terms in the objective function takes the form ci · xi + cj · xj = ci · (xi + xj ),
so everything depends only on the sum xi + xj (and does not depend on the
individual values of these variables).
Since this replacement can be done exactly when the coeﬃcients ci and cj
are equal, it makes sense to perform a similar replacement when the coeﬃcients
ci and cj are close to each other. In this case, we replace both coeﬃcients ci
and cj , e.g., by their average. Similarly, if we have several variables with similar
coeﬃcients ci , we replace all these coeﬃcients by the average value.
Not all the variables have similar coeﬃcients. Let us assume that for all
other variables xk , we have already selected some values, so only the variables
with similar coeﬃcients
∑ remain. In this case, the objective problem reduces to
optimizing
the
sum
ci · xi over remaining variables, and the constraint take
∑
the form xi = X0 , where X0 is equal to x0 minus the sum of already allocated
resources. If we now rename the remaining variables as x1 , . . . , xm , we arrive at
the following situation:
– the original problem is to maximize the sum f (x1 , . . . , xm ) =
the constraint

m
∑
i=1

m
∑
i=1

xi = X0 ;

ci · xi under

– for simplicity, we replace this original problem by the following one: maximize
m
m
∑
∑
the sum s(x1 , . . . , xm ) =
c · xi under the constraint
xi = X0 .
i=1

i=1

The simplified description provides, in general, a reasonable estimate for the
objective function. Let us ﬁrst show that the question is to estimate the value of
the objective function corresponding to given allocations x = (x1 , . . . , xm ), then
the estimation provided by the simpliﬁed expression is reasonably accurate.
Indeed, due to many diﬀerent factors, the actual values ci diﬀer from the
average c. There are so many diﬀerent reasons for this deviation, that it makes
def
sense to assume that the deviations ∆ci = ci − c are independent identically
distributed random variables, with mean 0 and some standard deviation σ. In
def
this case, the approximation error a = f (x1 , . . . , xm ) − s(x1 , . . . , xm ) takes the
m
∑
form a =
∆ci · xi . Since all ∆ci are independent, with mean 0 and stani=1

dard deviation
√ σ, their linear combination a has mean 0 and standard deviation
m
∑
σ[a] = σ ·
x2i . In particular, when the resources are approximately equally
i=1

X0
distributed between diﬀerent tasks, i.e., xi ≈
, this standard deviation is
m
σ
equal to σ[a] = X0 · √ . The actual value of the objective function is approxim
m
∑
mately equal to s(x1 , . . . , xm ) = c ·
xi = c · X0 . Thus, the relative accuracy of
i=1

σ[a]
σ
√ . When m is
=
s
c· m
large, this ratio is small, meaning that this simpliﬁcation indeed leads to a very
accurate estimation.
approximating f by s can be described as the ratio

For optimization, the simplified objective function can lead to drastic nonoptimality. From the mathematical viewpoint, the above optimization problem
m
∑
is easy to solve: to get the largest gain
ci · xi , we should allocate all the rei=1

sources X0 to the task that leads to the largest amount of gain per unit resource,
i.e., to the task with the largest possible value ci . In this case, the resulting gain
is equal to X0 · max ci .
i=1,...,m

On the other hand, for the simpliﬁed objective function, its value is the same
no matter how we distribute the resources, and is equal to X0 ·c. In this simpliﬁed
problem, it does not matter how we allocate the resources between the tasks, so
we can as well allocate them equally. In this case, the resulting gain is indeed
equal to X0 · c.
For random variables, the largest value max ci is often much larger than
the average c; moreover, the larger the sample size m, the more probable it is
that we will observe values which are much larger than the average. This is
especially true for power-law distributions which are frequent in economics and

ﬁnance; see, e.g., [1–4, 6–9, 12–14]. These distributions have heavy tails, with a
high probability of ci exceeding the mean. Thus, the simpliﬁed model can indeed
lead to very non-optimal solutions.
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